UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, DISCLAIMER The information contained herein is not current U S doctrine or policy and is not meant to supersede. doctrine commander s guidance or established unit standard operating procedures Examine and use the. information in light of your mission the operational environment the Law of Armed Conflict and other situational. factors This document does not constitute the provision of additional information or the approval of additional. information upon request, DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT C Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors. operations security 01Nov16 Other requests for this document shall be referred to Asymmetric Warfare Group Fort. Meade MD 20755, EXEMPTION NOTICE This document contains information that may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under the. Freedom of Information Act, COPYRIGHT NOTICE This document may contain copyrighted information. UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. U Table of Contents,FOREWORD iii,PURPOSE iv,NEW ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 1. RUSSIAN ORGANIZATION AND THREAT TACTICS TECHNIQUES AND. PROCEDURES 2, U S STRATEGIES TO DEFEAT AND MITIGATE RUSSIAN TTPS 29. U S TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS 35, APPENDIX 1 COUNTER TARGET ACQUISITION BATTLE DRILL 52. APPENDIX 2 SOURCES 58,ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 61,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,U FOREWORD, U As the American Army fought in Iraq and Afghanistan it became the best tactical level. counter insurgency force of the modern era America s enemies however did not rest Russia observed. the transformation of the American Army and began a transformation of their own This new military. barely resembles its former Soviet self Wielding a sophisticated blend of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. UAS electronic warfare EW jamming equipment and long range rocket artillery it took the Soviet. model out of the 1980s and into the 21st Century, U Ukraine s 2014 Euromaidan Revolution overthrew a corrupt Russian supported president. and threatened to place a pro European government in power on the very outskirts of the Russian. Federation In March 2014 Russia occupied Ukraine s Crimea with SPETsNAZ units in a virtually. bloodless operation SPETsNAZ then infiltrated into the Donbas region fomenting unrest and sparking a. pro Russian insurgency, U Over the next few months the Ukrainian military and volunteer militia fought back rather. successfully They pushed the separatists back to the very border with Russia Then everything changed. Russian regular troops with heavy equipment attacked across their border and fought a series of. encirclement battles resulting in hundreds of Ukrainian troops killed and the Ukrainian Anti Terror. Operation teetering on the brink of defeat, U How do we combat this enemy America has not encountered this type of conflict for nearly. a generation and needs to transform to fight and win in complex maneuver warfare Several factors. contribute to potential challenges U S formations may face in such a conflict It has been several years. since we deployed large numbers of troops in combat in Iraq or Afghanistan Our junior leaders both. officers and enlisted have less and less combat experience Our equipment has been designed to. combat an insurgency not an enemy with potential overmatch How do we protect our troops from. unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs communications and GPS jamming and layered air defense networks. U This handbook attempts to examine the tactics used by Russia in Ukraine as the military. component of their New Generation Warfare doctrine We will attempt to describe their capabilities and. applications of combat power Finally this handbook will present recommendations for U S Battalions. and Brigade Combat Teams to counter these Russian methods of war The war in Ukraine is still ongoing. The Russian Forces are still involved in Syria and continue to improve from their successes and shortfalls. We as American Soldiers must do the same As the saying goes Only fools learn from their mistakes. The wise man learns from the mistakes of others,Asymmetric Warfare Group. UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. U Beginning in February of 2014 Russian Forces occupied and annexed the Crimean peninsula. leading to the near dissolution of Ukraine s Navy Separatist forces enabled by Russian military support. began a conflict in Eastern Ukraine resulting in large amounts of the country turning into a war zone. Over twenty four months later Ukraine finds itself in a situation that has all the makings of a frozen. conflict The Minsk II ceasefire agreement has stymied offensive operations on the separatist side and. any offensive taken by the Ukrainian Armed Forces UAF will embolden Russia and provide probable. cause for recourse and reinvigorated separatist support. U As the global community became more aware of the circumstances western nations. provided assistance to the UAF in order to accomplish three things modernize the UAF doctrine. provide necessary equipment to level the playing field and build Ukrainian institutional capacity to help. train their forces in western military standards The training effort is well under way with many. countries providing assistance in areas such as medical logistics and staff training as well as training. entire battalions in more modernized western tactics While the training and assistance efforts are. progressing U S Forces should now begin contemplating how our formations should best prepare. themselves for the threats that the Ukrainian Armed Forces UAF face and identify gaps within our own. U The majority of this handbook will be centered on the Russian threat and how Russian Led. Separatist Forces RLSF conducted operations in Eastern Ukraine since March of 2014 Leaders at all. levels are starting to realize that U S engagements during the Global War on Terrorism have created a. force less than prepared to face a peer near peer conflict The RLSF s application and layering of their. systems increases accuracy and lethality while simultaneously degrading their opponent s capabilities. This has led to the U S Army taking a closer look at our force and identifying numerous capability gaps. within training and technology that formerly ensured U S overmatch. U Certain things have been bred into today s Soldier and dictate how we see the battlefield. We own the night the air have qualitative numerical superiority our technology is the best in the world. etc The assumption that we will have these capabilities is inherent to every planning process the Army. conducts Unfortunately these are not assumptions we can continue to safely make for our Soldiers in. preparing for future conflicts Training center rotations must be focused on exposing formations to new. threats and prioritize learning over winning the rotation This will bring back the basic skills our Army. focused on for years and before we lose the existing combat expertise within our force. U The overarching purpose of this handbook will be to identify training priorities that are not. currently a focus area within our ranks By providing commanders and senior enlisted leaders with. possible training gaps within our force leaders will begin thinking about the threat as it exists today in. Eastern Europe Our focus at the operational and tactical levels should not be on the newest kit but. what we have to do in order to achieve success without it The current era of a budget constrained Army. means that we must outthink our opponent and capitalize on his weaknesses This handbook is the. beginning to provide the necessary insights to inform our current force while simultaneously creating. best practices that units can share and expand upon. UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. U Figure 1 Russian Forces Modernization Infographic. UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. U Russian Organization and Threat Tactics Techniques. and Procedures,U Understanding the Environment, U Since the collapse of the Soviet Union a number of conflicts and reforms have shaped the. Russian military into what it is today Russia has observed the American lessons learned in Iraq and. Afghanistan as well as their own from the 2008 invasion of Georgia and applied these to the. development of their forces Several key changes have been implemented under Vladimir Putin the. current President of the Russian Federation in the previous decade These include a rapid. modernization and increased complexity of equipment attempts to professionalize military education. and a restructuring of the military to a more expeditionary model in order to project Russian influence. into Europe the Middle East and Asia, U The current state of Russia s military is a modernizing force with an increasingly. technological character It aligns its units and capabilities to satisfy a mission requirement Russia s use. of Battalion Tactical Groups BTGs gives Russia the capability to project its forces regionally with high. speed and intensity to achieve desired tactical operational and strategic goals1 This focus on smaller. expeditionary operations within Russia s regional sphere of influence means a more agile and modular. force than during the Cold War and even during the Chechnya conflict in the 1990 s This was noticeably. on display in their seizure of Crimea and the current conflict in Eastern Ukraine. U Russia has one of the highest military spending budgets in the world While this is nowhere. near the same real dollar amount as the United States Russia s military development and investment. has resulted in a significant increase in technical capabilities and personnel reformations To make up for. inadequate individual soldier training the Russian military relies mainly on either motorized or. mechanized units This allows them to compensate for their lower skill in maneuver warfare with. massive firepower Some current and developing aspects of Russian military vehicles focus on. eliminating human components and replacing them with a mechanism such as the autoloader on tanks. and Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty Infantry Fighting Vehicle BMPs This is cheaper than training housing. and paying soldiers which allows the Russian military to invest more in firepower However Russia has. made significant strides to modernize its military force and adapt it to use more sophisticated. technologies This involves significant investment into soldiers and a more professional soldier force2. U Russia has tried to professionalize its force by investing in contracted soldiers volunteers. The majority of Russia s military consists of conscripts drafted for 1 year service periods By the time. these conscripts receive training and are sent to a unit they may only have 6 8 months left before being. demobilized This severely limits the quality of the average Russian soldier and unit as a whole. Professional soldiers inherently have more experience and training than the 1 year conscripts that. circulate out of the formations every 6 months Professionalization efforts have been a large focus area. for Russia for years but are still a significant challenge. Grau L L 1989 The Soviet Combined Arms Battalion Reorganization for Tactical Flexibility Ft Levenworth Kansas DTIC. Thornton R 2011 Military Modernization and the Russian Ground Forces Carlisle Pennsylvania U S Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. U The primary maneuver element favored by the Russian military is the battalion organized as. a Battalion Tactical Group The BTG is significant because the Tactical Group is built around its mission It. can be augmented with any enabler to facilitate its mission BTGs are usually used as reinforcements in. strategically vital engagements and held in reserve until they are needed. U Russian Ground forces have updated their military doctrine to reflect these numerous. changes in their organization equipment and tactics Their new doctrine views the military as part of a. broader national whole of government, approach to warfare This Gerasimov U Gerasimov Doctrine. Doctrine named after the current Russian The doctrine posits that the. rules of war have changed that, Chief of the General Staff is outside the scope there is a blurring of the lines. of this work However at the tactical level between war and peace and. Russia still refers to doctrine as an ustav or that nonmilitary means of. mandate which informs commanders and achieving military and strategic. goals has grown and in many, tactical decision makers on how to conduct their cases exceeded the power of. operations The most recent editions have weapons in their effectiveness. begun to include sketches and proposed Douglas Farah The CIPHER Brief. solutions to tactical problems This approach to,U Figure 2 General of the Army Valeri Gerasimov. doctrine as a science rather than an art is a,holdover from Soviet doctrinal methodology. and part of the Russian military culture3,U ASYMMETRIC WARFARE. U Over the past 15 plus years U S formations have become familiar with the term. asymmetric warfare or tactics Because of the nature of Iraq and Afghanistan many have come to see. this as a new approach to warfare Or as a strategy between two opponents of drastically different. strengths usually used by the weaker opponent i e the U S and the Taliban or Al Qaida with the U S. being technologically and financially superior to both of its opponents. U An apt description of Asymmetric approaches and thinking appeared in Dr Rod Thornton s. publication Asymmetric Warfare Threat and Response in the Twenty First Century. The September 11 attack was perhaps the supreme example of what has come to be known as. asymmetric warfare This,phrase is one that is now U Dr Rod Thornton. dominating the lexicon of Dr Rod Thornton is a prior service British Army infantry. Officer with service in Germany Cyprus Northern Ireland. military and security forces and Bosnia He studied Russian and Serbo Croat and then. around the developed took two masters degrees His PhD was from the University. world At its simplest of Birmingham and involved a comparison of British. asymmetric warfare is Russian and US peace support operations He has several. publication on Asymmetric and Counter Insurgency, violent action undertaken Warfare and Easter Europe. by the have nots against,the haves whereby the U Figure 3 Dr Rod Thornton. have nots by the state or, sub state actors seek to generate profound effects at all levels of warfare however defined from the. Ministry of Defense Russian Federation 2005 Battle Directives on the Preparation and Conduct of a Combined Armes Battle Section 3 Squad Platoon and. Tank Section Moscow Military Publication,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, tactical to strategic by employing their own specific relative advantages against the vulnerabilities of. much stronger opponents Often this will mean that the weak will use the methods that lie outside the. norms of warfare methods that are radically different It is the element of difference that lies at the. heart of asymmetric approaches, asymmetric does not mean unequal Symmetrical implies a mirror image sometimes the. image can be smaller but nonetheless a likeness exists Asymmetrical implies a relationship that can. not be considered alike And here it is useful to point out that asymmetric techniques can also be. applied by the stronger power4,U HYBRID MANEUVER, U During the Georgian and Ukrainian crises Russia has developed a new approach to their. operations which is widely referred to as Russian New Generation Warfare RNGW 4th Generation. Warfare Hybrid War etc In truth Russia has been able to redefine their objective and efficiently apply. U Hybrid Force Composition,CONV Conventional forces. SPZ SpetsNaz Russian version of SOF forces,AAA Advise Assist Accompany Teams. CTR Contracted forces from outside the,area of operations usually sign a contract. and serve along LOC forces,LOC Militarized local population. PMC Private Military Contractor,U Figure 4 Hybrid Force Composition. instruments of national power to achieve that objective The new objective is not victory in a conflict. but regime change Because the new objective is the change of an entire system of government the. RNGW approach can use any lever of influence in their reach to achieve this change Not all regime. changes have to be resolved with a military option but when a military lever is activated it is done by. with and through segments of the local population The involvement of locals gives validity to military. action on the world stage This makes it appear like a popular action and produces the Hybrid. Maneuver concept that we see Russia employing in Ukraine Syria and elsewhere With the current. state of Russia s Security Force Assistance SFA it is safe to assume that a Hybrid Maneuver force will. become common with a Russian footprint, U During Hybrid Maneuver the brunt of the fighting will be borne by locally organized units. These units fall under the government structure of the Russian supported regime and have their own. military organization which mirrors or mimics Russian Forces These forces will have basic equipment. provided by Russian Advise Assist and Accompany AAA teams AAA teams synchronize the Hybrid. force s operations by embedding Russian officers in the Hybrid force structure Hybrid maneuver focuses. on the local effort conducting the majority of the fighting with support from Russian conventional forces. when the mission has strategic and operational importance. Thornton D R 2007 Asymmetric Warfare threat and response in the twenty first century Malden MA Polity Press. UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. U During hybrid maneuver in Eastern Ukraine the unit of choice has become the BTG This is in. spite of the fact that Russia has identified weaknesses in the BTG structure and are moving back towards. a divisional model A BTG is a tailored force centered on the mission it will be executing This force. usually consists of three core units infantry armor and artillery It will be further augmented with other. assets such as Electronic Warfare EW Air Defense Artillery ADA and other capabilities under the. battalion commander s control,U Russian Conventional Organization. U FOUO Figure 5 Core Tank Battalion,T90 SERIES,CREW 3 PAX. MAX SPEED ROAD OFF ROAD 65kmh 45kmh,MAIN ARMAMENT 125 mm Smoothbore. AUXILLARY WEAPONS 7 62 mm COAX MG 12 7mm NSVT, COMBAT LOAD Main Gun 43rds 7 62 2000rds 12 7 300rds. T80 SERIES,CREW 3 PAX,MAX SPEED ROAD OFF ROAD 70kmh 48kmh. MAIN ARMAMENT 125 mm Smoothbore,AUXILLARY WEAPONS 7 62 mm COAX MG 12 7mm. NSVT AA MG,COMBAT LOAD Main Gun 45rds 7 62 1250rds 12 7. UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. T72 SERIES,CREW 3 PAX,MAX SPEED ROAD OFF ROAD 60kmh 45kmh. MAIN ARMAMENT 125 mm Smoothbore,AUXILLARY WEAPONS 7 62 mm COAX MG 12 7mm. NSVT AA MG,COMBAT LOAD Main Gun 45rds 7 62 2000rds 12 7. U FOUO Figure 6 Core Motorized or Mechanized Rifle Battalion. CREW 3 PAX 7 passengers,MAX SPEED ROAD OFF ROAD 100kmh 50kmh. MAIN ARMAMENT 30 MM Automatic Gun 2A42 or,AUXILLARY WEAPONS 7 62 mm PKT MG. COMBAT LOAD 30 mm 500rds AGL 400 rds 7 62,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,CREW 3 PAX 7 passengers. MAX SPEED ROAD OFF ROAD 70kmh 45kmh,MAIN ARMAMENT 100 mm Rifled Gun 2A70. AUXILLARY WEAPONS 7 62 mm COAX MG,COMBAT LOAD Main Gun 48rds 7 62 2000rds. 9P162 KORNET,CREW 2 3 PAX,MAX SPEED ROAD OFF ROAD 70kmh 45kmh. MAIN ARMAMENT KORNET ATGM,RATE OF FIRE 3 4 missiles per minute. COMBAT LOAD 16 LR rounds 10 16 HEAT up to 6 HE,U Anti Access Area Denial A2 AD Systems. U The U S has held air superiority in conflicts dating back to the Korean War Since enemies. have not challenged this in recent memory U S forces have come to take air superiority for granted. Even during the Vietnam War U S aircraft were able to provide air support and overwhelm the North. Vietnamese Air Force Since then the Army uses air assets for reconnaissance transportation fire. support and medical evacuation In Iraq and Afghanistan light infantry units have come to depend on. air support with extended station time and clear communication lines to the forces on the ground. U Compared to other militaries in the world air power is simply the biggest enabler for U S. forces Because of this Russia has gone to great lengths to develop air defense capabilities on strategic. operational and tactical levels to deny American s the use of this capability Russian air defense. capabilities exist at the battalion level and higher and can also be used task organized down to the. company level if the situation requires it, U Russia s air defense capabilities consist of direct fire missile and EW platforms Strategic. assets are large and cumbersome systems but are capable of providing air defense to ground units up. to a 300 kilometer radius On the operational and tactical levels Russian missile air defense systems are. self propelled either on tracked or wheeled vehicles The majority of current systems consist of single. vehicle models that have the self contained ability to conduct target acquisition plot a firing solution. and engage a target At the tactical level battalion s possess shoulder fired missiles MANPADS and. light tracked or wheeled ADA systems,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,U Figure 7 Russian ADA Protection Concept. UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. U MANPADS are one of the most significant threats to U S formations Commanders can. conduct Suppression of Enemy Air Defense SEAD missions to shape their AO but the ability to conduct. SEAD against MANPADS carried within the line infantry formations is extremely limited This is especially. true if these systems are used in urban areas around civilians as is the case in Eastern Ukraine Within. the first few months of the conflict in Donetsk and Lugansk Ukraine the Ukrainian military lost several. helicopters ground attack aircraft and even a fully loaded troop transport all to MANPAD systems. U Russia uses a very dense network of air defense systems that overlap in layers to increase. their protective capabilities Gaps in coverage can also be filled by new EW systems that confuse. incoming missiles overload ordnance guidance modules or cause premature detonation of electronic. fuses Faced with this type of air defense network U S formations will at best be able to achieve brief. or momentary air superiority to support ground troops Russian Air Defense capabilities will also. severely impact aerial resupply and medical evacuation MEDEVAC Though Russia publicly announces. its adherence to the Geneva Convention and recognizes internationally protected symbols this does. not mean that Russia s automated Air Defense systems will recognize a MEDEVAC as an off limits target. This is similar to the case of Malaysian Airline s Flight MH 17 which was shot down by a BUK missile. system over Ukraine in July 2014,SA 11 Gadfly BuK M1 2. PRIMARY PURPOSE Protect task forces and, installations from attacks of prospective high speed. tactical and strategic aircraft under intensive,electronic counter action. DETECTION RANGE Up to 20 km,MAX ENGAGEMENT RANGE Up to 15 km. SIMULTANEOUSLY ENGAGED TGTS Up to 6,REACTION TIME Up to 18 sec. SA 22 Greyhound Pantsyr S1,CREW 3 PAX,ARMAMENT 2 X 30mm Guns 12. MAX ROAD SPEED 90 kph,AIRCRAFT DETECTION RANGE 30 km. ENGAGEMENT RANGE 3 km for Guns,20 km for Missiles,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,SA 10 Grumble S 300VM. PRIMARY PURPOSE Protect task forces from mass attacks of. med range theatre level ballistic missiles as well as strategic. and tactical aircraft,DETECTION RANGE Up to 250 km. SIMULTANEOUSLY ENGAGED TGTS Up to 24,CONTINUOUS OPERATION TIME Up to 48 hrs. SA 21 Growler S 400,CREW Variable,MISSILE CAPACITY 4. MAX ROAD SPEED 70 kph,MISSILE RANGE Up to 250 km,MISSILE ALTITUDE Up to 27 km. SUPPORT VEHICLES 55K6E Mobile,Command Post 91N6E Big Bird Radar. 92N6E Fire Control Radar,NUMBER OF SIMULTANEOUS,TARGETS 36. MAX RANGE 25 km,SIMULTANEOUS DETECTED TRACKED TGTS 48. SIMULTANEOUS ENGAGEMENTS 2,NUMBER OF SAMs 8 CV Mounted. REACTION TIME AFTER DETECTION 5 8 sec,UNCLASSIFIED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
Donald L Kirkpatrick, Professor Emeritus, University Of Wisconsin first published his ideas in 1959, in a series of articles in the Journal of American Society of Training Directors. The articles were subsequently included in Kirkpatrick's book Evaluating Training Programs. Kirkpatrick
HEKASI. The CFILS Instructional and Schematic Guide includes fifteen (15) instructional plans with NAT parallel tests, science vocabulary words, and mathematical operational clue words and modified spelling scheme instructions.These activities are undertaken during the one-hour extended instructional time for 15 weeks.
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